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The  public  budget  seen  as  a  balance  for  revenues  and  expenditures  but  also  as  the  main  financial 
instrument of governmental policies, does not reflects simply data, numbers or amounts of income or 
expenditure. The budget also reflects judgments on criteria, benchmarks and how they come to be included 
in a budget or another or the way revenues or financing costs from a budget that involves other budget 
components  are  targeted.  From  this  perspective,  our  paper  aims  to  identify  the  coordinates  that 
relationships between system components are built on, regarding the budget revenues, including the effects 
of such endeavour. 
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Introduction  
Intergovernmental  fiscal  relations  are  a  component  of  primary  importance  for  the  public 
budgetary system, since it depends on the functionality of the essential links that are established 
between the public budgets. From this perspective, the revenue allocation of public budgets, 
along with the award of public expenditures, intergovernmental transfers system and regulation 
of local borrowing are the basic pillars of fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentralization process 
is, for the transition countries in particular, an important component of administrative reform, 
conditioning through the design and promotion of the overall reform its results. For this reason, 
we intend to explore possible arrangements for the award of public revenues between public 
budgets  in  direct  relation  with  their  effects  on  the  provision  of  public  goods  at  different 
administrative levels. 
 
Fiscal arrangements theoretical bases  
Reasons underlying public budgets revenue allocation joins the issue of fiscal-budgetary policy, 
because decisions on public financial resources mobilised to the public budgets are in essence a 
result of the fiscal-budgetary policy decisions. It is recognized as a general rule that to central 
budgets are mobilized those revenues that have as a source activities throughout the entire state, 
while the local budgets concentrate resources from economic and social activities carried out 
within the perimeter of the administrative-territorial unit
189. Also, it should be noted that income 
concentrated  at  central  (federal)  level  come  from  a  consistent  base,  resulting  in  substantial 
revenues, but they also have a more sensitive basis for settlement to economic conjuncture while 
revenue  mobilized  at  local  budgets  come  from  sources  that  are  less  consistent,  sometimes 
excessively  "shattered",  but  more  stable.  We  believe  that  a  possible  explanation  for  this 
customary way of promoting the relationships between the components of the budgetary system 
when it comes to its income part is the need for a coherent fiscal policy and a wider general 
political, economic and social one, to be designed as general directions at the central level in a 
uniform manner and completed within certain limits with decisions left to local authorities. Such 
a view results from the way some specialists consider the functions of the public budget and, 
implicitly,  the  role  of  central  and  local  authorities.  Musgrave  expressed  the  idea  that  the 
involvement of authorities throughout the public budget should be "divided” into three functions 
(branches): macroeconomic stabilization, (equitable) income distribution and efficient resources 
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allocation
190. With regard to macroeconomic stabilization, as a rule, this is a privilege of central 
authorities
191. The reason for such an approach is represented on the one hand, by the need for 
coherent  policies  and,  on  the  other  hand,  by  the  fact  that  local  authorities,  having  limited 
territorial jurisdiction, cannot influence macroeconomic conditions. 
In these circumstances, it can be considered that revenues source such as income tax revenue of 
enterprises or the progressive income tax for individuals are to be used as leverage to obtain the 
expected effects (macroeconomic stabilization), the first one because the profit fluctuates under 
the economic general conditions and the latter because of differential tax rates allow selective 
action. This would mean that these sources of income must be always assigned to the central 
authorities, not necessarily excluding the possibility that local authorities can raise some revenue 
through  income  taxes  placed  on  individuals  (of  copyright,  self-employed  or  seasonal,  etc.). 
However, it is possible that these sources of income should be allocated to local authorities, but 
under  a  rigorous  control  of  the  central  authorities.  As  a  result,  local  authorities  should  be 
acknowledged the right to raise those revenues coming from less sensitive sources to economic 
conjuncture (taxes on buildings, land, means of transport etc.)  
Similarly, the second aspect of the involvement of public authorities throughout public budgets as 
Musgrave  suggests,  meaning  the  (fair)  redistribution  income  is  usually  associated  with  the 
intervention of central authorities, especially due the reason of a consistent approach to the whole 
society, eliminating the risk of creating distortions in the geographical allocation of resources by 
different actions of local authorities. In the progressive tax context, those who support higher tax 
rate may try to avoid charging a higher rate by moving to another administrative-territorial unit 
(fiscal jurisdiction). This movement reduces the original proportions (equitable redistribution) of 
the  effects  that  are  being  watched.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  author  suggests  the 
intervention correlated with the help of public expenditure (for social protection, for example), 
whose implementation is within the jurisdiction of local governments, but funding to implement 
them comes from the central level. We believe that the "danger" of mobility of high incomes and 
capital due to progressive tax rates set by local authorities remains only a potential one, because 
the decision to change domicile depends on other factors as well, in many cases more powerful 
than  the  tax rate  (the  family,  culture,  tradition,  etc.).  Therefore,  allocation  of income  tax  of 
individuals  to  local  levels  of  government  can  bear  equitable  redistribution  of  income,  being 
corrected, if necessary, with the intervention through forms of public spending (subsidies or aid 
to the socially challenged individuals).  
The third aspect of the involvement of the public budget, resource allocation, aims at satisfying a 
part of the social needs by offering utilities (services) created with the help of public financial 
resources.  Musgrave  believes  that  the  policies  promoted  at  local  levels  (supported  by  local 
budgets) should allow for and reflect the various preferences of people living in a territorial 
administrative unit. Giving the right to mobilize resources locally is, from this perspective, more 
efficient  than  the  central  allocation  (transfers),  because  local  authorities  have  more  specific 
information on residents' preferences than the central ones.  
Following another milestone in the award revenues to public budgets, we believe that treating the 
issue of revenue mobilization without taking into account the issue of their use, it cannot be fully 
satisfactory.  Thus,  it is  required  that  the  services  provided  by  public  authorities  be  partially 
financed  through  taxes  borne  by  recipients  and  not  always  offered  for  free.  This  way  of 
promoting the supply of public utilities is likely to lead to an more responsible use of financial 
resources of the nation. The recipient who once forced to bear a share of service costs will give 
up the use of services which are not really necessary, services that he would be consuming if they 
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were free of charge. Also we believe that establishing a link between income and funded service 
(only for services that allow it), such as taxes on vehicles or road taxes included in the price of 
fuel, is beneficial in the context of the measurement of a cost-benefits analysis results
192. 
From the perspective of the link between the mobilized financial resources and the effects of 
public spending financed by their account, the central authorities should mobilize revenues for 
those public utilities which have a wide national resonance (e.g.: defence, external affairs etc.) 
and that practically cannot be offered by local authorities. Similarly, the decision on the right of 
mobilization of revenue available to the public authorities should take into account that these 
offers limited services at the level of administrative-territorial unit.  
The issue of delimitation of the right of mobilization of financial resources between the various 
levels of government or public authorities may not however be limited to a review of the alleged 
economic matters, because specific decisions must take account of other reasons, such as local 
autonomy and fiscal competition.  
First,  a  rational  division  of  the  rights  over  sources  of  revenue  between  central  and  local 
authorities is to ensure the control of the latter over its own developments regarding tax and even, 
according  to  some  authors,  "fiscal  sovereignty".  But  it  also  should  be  noted  that  from  the 
perspective of the overall functionality of the public budgetary system, a very strict demarcation 
can create major vertical and horizontal imbalances and fiscal sovereignty should not be seen as a 
support of a possible financial independence of local communities just for this reason. Only the 
discretionary power of subnational authorities must be limited to those revenues which they may 
establish (independently) in relation to services provided and not extended to all incomes of local 
budgets. It is important that local authorities should receive benefit from their own resources to 
finance public services, whether they come from mandatory contributions even established at 
local level or left it here by central authorities, whether they enjoy these resources in addition to 
balancing grants (unconditional) from the central authority, granted by a formula that ensures 
medium or long term predictability. In addition to these two possibilities, balancing revenue can 
be  transmitted  (for  certain  actions  to  be  financed)  under  certain  conditions  by  the  central 
authority, local autonomy being somewhat diminished.  
Where local authorities are recognized the right to establish local taxes and to determine their 
level,  there  is  the  possibility  of  obtaining  marginal  income,  excluded  if  practicing  revenues 
sharing between levels of government. A real financial autonomy is exercised only when local 
authorities can control their “own” income levels.  
Another landmark for consideration in establishing the relationships between public budgetary 
system components is the subsidiarity in taxation. As a requirement imposed by the Maastricht 
Treaty,  subsidiarity  means  that  the  decision  be  taken  at  the  level  of  government  closest  to 
citizens,  provided  that  such  an  approach  does  not  lead  to  major  distortions.  Applied  to  tax 
assignment, subsidiarity requires that a tax should be raised from the lowermost administrative 
level can implement it and is not going to be inadequate. Such an approach would minimize any 
vertical fiscal imbalances due to the fact that many subnational authorities have difficulties in the 
implementation of taxes, while the central (federal) can implement any kind of tax (even if it is 
traditionally regarded as "local taxes").  
Another  aspect  that  should  be  discussed  in  connection  with  the  fiscal  arrangements  is  local 
accountability  and  fiscal  competition  between  municipalities.  Accountability  requires  that 
assignment  of  revenue  sources  to  local  authorities  to  be  made  so  as  to  get  the  authorities 
interested in obtaining new sources of income, to identify, to stimulate and to exploit them. 
Competition implies that capital holders will invest where the size of the tax determined by the 
size of local benefits exceeds their costs incurred in the local budgets (or is very close to it) and 
                                                       
192  Moşteanu,  T.,  Iacob,  M.,  Fiscal  Federalism,  Theoretical  and  Applied  Economics,  2007,  vol.  11,  p.  21, 
http://econpapers.repec.org/. 297 
 
will channel resources to other local jurisdictions, where this relationship is more beneficial. 
Similar, but not only for the stated reason, workers may carry out work in other administrative-
territorial units than those in which they live, but consuming public utilities (at least partially 
financed by the state) where they live (e.g.: children are receiving education in administrative-
territorial unit where domiciled and not where they parents work and pay taxes). These issues are 
likely to have some shortcomings in the economic and social development of local communities, 
by  the lack  or  the  decreasing  of  investment,  unemployment,  etc.  Also,  similar to  mentioned 
phenomena require a wider involvement of authorities (for example, to support disadvantaged 
categories), which will lead to an increase in public expenditure, entailing greater imbalances.  
 
Alternatives of public budgets revenue allocation 
In relation to the landmarks treated above, we conclude that there cannot be an optimal method, 
an universally valid tax assignment between the public budget system components, but we can 
identify  several  possibilities,  taking  into  account  how  the  decision-makers  (the  central 
authorities) place more emphasis on some of the judgements shown above.  
To construct alternatives of allocation of financial resources to the components of the public 
budgetary system, we take into consideration the following reasons:  
-  Which  level  of  government  decides  from  which  charges  the  local  authorities  will  obtain 
income? 
- Which level of government establishes the settlement of tax?  
- Which level of government sets the tax rate?  
- Which level of government administers the tax in question?  
Compared to the degree of local financial autonomy, the ability to set rates (quotas) of the tax is 
the most important aspect because it enables local authorities to autonomously establish the level 
(size) of public utilities offer. Be noted that local authorities cannot be left with the absolute 
choice to set the required contributions needed to be mobilized, since it would create failures for 
the  entire  budgetary  system  (for  example,  if  local  authorities  would  raise  customs  duties). 
Similarly, an excessive discretion in determining the tax base or revenue management can create 
an undue administrative complexity and disparities or distortions in resource allocation.  
Therefore, as a first possibility of substantiation of the relationships between the central budget 
and local budgets concerning the revenue sector we may have achieve the highest degree of 
financial autonomy for local governments. Such an approach will allow local governments to 
choose the taxes they impose, to determine the tax base and the tax rate and to administer the 
revenues obtained. The most convincing example for such an approach is, in general, the federal 
state that specifically gives a broad autonomy to subnational authorities, especially in the U.S., 
where the federal states have almost unlimited possibilities for a decision on the four aspects 
previously discussed. However, we emphasize that such an approach taken to extremes can create 
failures, because some authorities may establish fees radically different from those established by 
other authorities (for example, in some jurisdictions to determine taxes on retail while in other 
VAT), define the tax base in radically different ways or administer the same charge in different 
ways. Within certain limits, the inequities and economic distortions created may be admitted if 
decentralization  is  to  benefit,  but  in  a  situation  where  they  record  increased  levels,  central 
authorities must intervene by setting common rules (e.g.: for assessment of the tax base). This 
happened in the U.S. in 1957, when was proposed the adoption of the federal act that included 
rules for assessment of corporate income tax, which is presently applied (with some changes) so 
far in 25 states. Even so, it can still be found substantial differences in the taxation of profits 
between federal states; the act in question is not quite comprehensive. The situation is similar in 
the case of taxes on sales, where each of the 46 U.S. states (including DC) defines the tax base in 
full freedom.  298 
 
A  second  choice  for  substantiation  of  the  relationship  between  public  budgetary  system 
components related to revenues which can be promoted in parallel with the first option presented, 
in order to avoid its potential negative effects, is enabling local authorities to collect such called 
"extra-quota" taxes  due to some central budgets (surcharges). In this case, the top authority sets 
the tax base and collecting both its own revenue, as well as those from additional allowances 
established by local authorities due to budgets managed by them. Basically, the situation may be 
diametrically opposed as well, in the sense that subnational authorities can mobilize and manage 
additional-quotas added to central taxes previously raised by local authorities. An example can be 
found in Germany, where resources from value added tax (income entitled to federal state) are 
administered by the Länder
193. Practicing additional quotas due to the central budget from local 
authorities  has  the  effect that the latter  have  the  power  considered  most  important from  the 
perspective of financial autonomy (setting tax rates) and top authorities will define the tax base in 
a  global/unitary  manner  and  they  will  manage  in  a  similar  manner  the  mobilized  resources, 
avoiding the shortcomings of the first option exposed. An essential element for additional quotas 
practice is that, in general, it should be established "jurisdiction" of the taxation of income. This 
is a relatively simple thing in the case of taxes such as tax on wages, but it is more complicated if 
the taxation of income represents profits. This occurs because corporate income is obtained from 
a wider area (market) of territory, which includes several jurisdictions, but without being able to 
monitor  and  impose  in  a  distinct  manner  the  corresponding  "parts"  of  income.  For  such  a 
situation, the literature has been advanced as a possible solution the creation and application of a 
formula that divides the tax base between jurisdictions, but without reaching a concrete result. 
However, we think that this solution is not entirely impossible, and it may be fully satisfactory, as 
it should be based on variables of orientation (e.g.: average income per capita, population etc.) 
without being able to exactly quantify the “part" of profit that should become tax base for a 
certain jurisdiction.  
A third option for substantiating the relationship between public budgetary system components 
regarding the choice of sharing some taxes between various components of the budgetary system. 
This possibility is considered
194 less attractive to local authorities than the previous because they 
would  have  fixed  proportions  of  income  from  central  budget,  without  the  possibility  of  any 
influence regarding the amount of these incomes. In most cases, the shares of revenues of the 
central  authorities that  would  be  allocated  to  the  budgets  of  local  authorities are established 
without any distinction for the latter. The advantage of such ways of delimiting the relationship 
between budgets is that of absence of extreme differences as exposed in the first option. Certain 
independence is registered in determining the sources of income by local authorities but also 
local financial autonomy is restricted. Although local authorities have the freedom to decide how 
these resources will be spent, they cannot influence the size (the amount of) mobilized resources, 
so that they cannot control the size of any future local expenditures. Moreover, especially in less 
developed countries or transition countries (Romanian case)
195, the amount of such income is not 
predictable, even for shorter terms, preventing the application of consistent and continuous local 
policies. However, in developed countries, the experience shows that trough the collaboration of 
all subnational authorities it can be achieved a certain stability both on tax sharing (and hence, 
predictability) and also on reconsideration of the amount of revenues shared between various 
levels of governance and budgetary components managed by them.  
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The last option for substantiating the relationships between central and local budgets reveals the 
choice for some revenue sharing, using a distribution formula based on variables such as the 
average  income  per  capita,  population,  fiscal  capacity,  public  establishments  etc.  Unlike  the 
options discussed above, this time there is not connection between the origin (place of origin) of 
the tax base and the entity that is receiving the revenues from taxation, but  it is done simply a 
redistribution of resources among different authorities subnational. Thus, there is a more direct 
way to report the level of incomes that will come from local authorities budgets and their general 
needs, not only to their economic situation. Such a way of substantiation of the relationship 
between the components of budgetary system implemented without adequate "corrections" may 
have  some  negative  effects.  One  of  this  is  the  lack  of  participation  or  interest  of  local 
communities with a weak economic development in obtaining new sources of income. On the 
other  hand,  from  the  perspective  of  provided  financial  autonomy  the  only  freedom  of  local 
authorities is to decide how they will use these resources. For this reason, we believe that the 
redistribution formula should include an index of weighting tax efforts’ that will reflect the size 
of the marginal revenue derived from their own sources of income.  
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, one can appreciate that the foundation of the most balanced relationships between 
the components  of public  budgetary  system  is  the additional  fixed-rates  established by  local 
authorities for some taxes of central authorities, placing it at the intersection of local autonomy 
requirements with the need to avoid major imbalances or distortions.  
Any way of background to these reports, however, leaves room for the emergence of horizontal 
or vertical fiscal imbalances (between levels of government or between components on the same 
level). Vertical imbalances are determined by the fact that some taxes have to be administered by 
central authorities (such as VAT) and horizontal imbalances have as source different economic 
realities that local communities are confronted. It is obvious that the size of tax base determines, 
in an objective manner the level of resources that can be mobilized, especially that the setting of 
higher tax rates for less economically developed communities, in order to obtain higher returns 
would be an action with adverse effects. Thus, the only relevant solution is to implement a 
system of equalization grants from the central budget to local ones, designed to also reflect the 
efforts of local communities for obtaining additional incomes. 
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